# Decision making under uncertainty Lecture 4 

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## Examples

## Example

Insurance
DM has wealth $w$ and faces loss $L$ with probability $p$.
DM can buy insurance that costs $r$ per unit; a unit pays out unity in case of loss.
DM's problem is

$$
\begin{equation*}
m a x_{x} p u(w-L-r x+x)+(1-p) u(w-r x) \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The first order condition is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
p u^{\prime}(w-L-r x+x)(1-r)-(1-p) u^{\prime}(w-r x) r=0 \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

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For a risk averse DM this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal solution $x^{*}(p, L, r)$.
One immediately sees that for an actuarially fair insurance, or $r=p$, the solution is given by $x^{*}=L$.
For some other price there is over or under insurance.

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From 2 one finds by total differentiation

$$
\begin{gather*}
\frac{d x}{d r}= \\
\frac{p u^{\prime \prime}(w-L+(1-r) x) x(1-r)+p u^{\prime}(w-L+(1-x) r)-(1-p) u^{\prime \prime}(w-r)}{p u^{\prime \prime}(w-L+(1-x) r)(1-r)^{2}+(1-p) u^{\prime \prime}(w-r x)}
\end{gather*}
$$

Thus, if the insurer is a monopoly its maximisation problem is

$$
\max _{r} r x-p x
$$

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The first order condition is

$$
\begin{equation*}
x+(r-p) \frac{d x}{d r}=0 \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

This gives some indication why usually the actuarially fair price is assumed.
The LHS of 4 evaluated at $r=p$ is given by $x>0$. Thus, the monopoly would like to raise the price.

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Let us return to the assumption of a fixed price, and see how DM's wealth affects things.
Differentiating (2) with respect to wealth one gets expression

$$
p u^{\prime \prime}(w-L+(1-r) x)(1-r)-(1-p) u^{\prime \prime}(w-r x) r
$$

Evaluate this at $x^{*}$ dividing the first term by $p u^{\prime}(w-L-r x+x)(1-r)$ and the second term by $(1-p) u^{\prime}(w-r x) r$ to get an expression of the same sign

$$
\frac{u^{\prime \prime}(w-L+(1-r) x)}{u^{\prime}(w-L+(1-r) x)}-\frac{u^{\prime \prime}(w-r x)}{u^{\prime}(w-r x)}
$$

The sign is the difference between Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion at wealth levels $w-r x$ and $w-L+(1-r) x$. If the DM has decreasing absolute risk aversion the amount of insurance goes down when wealth increases

## Examples

- Risk aversion is a local measure but people tend to use it like a global one.
- Assuming that a person is risk averse everywhere leads so some weird consequences.


## Example

Assume that a DM rejects an even gamble to win 11 and to lose 10. The s/he should reject any even gamble to win $X$ and to lose 1000 for any $X$.

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To see the logic assume that initial wealth is $w$.
Rejecting the gamble is equivalent to

$$
u(w+11)-u(w)<u(w)-u(w-10)
$$

or the worth of the eleventh unit is at most $10 / 11$ of the worth of the tenth unit lost.
Or $u^{\prime}(w+11) \leq \frac{u(w+11)-u(w)}{11} \leq \frac{10}{11} \frac{u(w)-u(w-10)}{10} \leq \frac{10}{11} u^{\prime}(w-10)$.
Changes in the wealth in interval $[-10,11]$ are associated with a loss of about $10 \%$ in marginal utility.
If a DM rejects the above gamble at all wealth levels then going up in 21 unit steps marginal utility keeps decreasing by more than 10/11.
As the marginal utility diminishes faster than a geometric series this implies that there is not finite amount $X$ that the DM would accept in an even gamble with a loss of 1000 .

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This as a critique of expected utility theory has a couple of weak points.
The first is evident, namely that the result relies on rejecting a certain gamble at all wealth levels; this might not be observable in practice.
The second is the idea that the DM's preferences are over final wealth levels.
von Neumann-Morgenstern axiomatisation, however, is silent about the outcomes of the gambles; they might as well be changes in relative wealth.
Rabin's absurd results are easily avoided by allowing more flexible utility functions.

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Perhaps more interesting is the Ellsberg paradox.
There are two urns with red and blue balls.
In urn-1 there 50 red balls and 50 blue balls.
In urn-2 there are altogether 100 red and/or blue balls but nothing more is know about their numbers.
Gamble $g_{r}^{1}$ gives 50 if a random draw from urn- 1 is a red ball and zero otherwise.
Gamble $g_{b}^{1}$ gives 50 if a random draw from urn- 1 is a blue ball and zero otherwise.
Gamble $g_{r}^{2}$ gives 50 if a random draw from urn-2 is a red ball and zero otherwise.
Gamble $g_{b}^{2}$ gives 50 if a random draw from urn-2 is a blue ball and zero otherwise.

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In hypothetical situations as well as in experiments people are indifferent between $g_{r}^{1}$ and $g_{b}^{1}$, as well as $g_{r}^{2}$ and $g_{b}^{2}$.
But they prefer $g_{r}^{1}$ to $g_{r}^{2}$, as well as $g_{b}^{1}$ to $g_{b}^{2}$.
This seems to lead to the conclusion that in gamble $g_{r}^{2}$ the proportion of red balls is less than $\frac{1}{2}$, and the proportion of blue balls is less than $\frac{1}{2}$.
The DM's attitude towards gambles is known as ambiguity averseness.

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Kreps 6.8. Assume that consumer's wealth is $y$, there are two goods, and von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences are given by $u(x, y)=f(x+y)$ where $f$ is an increasing.
Consider two prices $p=(1,3)$ and $p^{\prime}=(3,1)$.
We show that the consumer prefers risky situation where the prices $p$ and $p^{\prime}$ with equal probabilities to price $\frac{1}{2} p+\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime}=(2,2)$. When each good costs 2 the consumer does not care which one to buy and gets utility $f\left(\frac{y}{2}\right)$.
When prices are either $p$ or $p^{\prime}$ consumer buys the cheaper good and gets utility $f(y)$.

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Assume next that the preferences are given by $f(\min \{x, y\})$ where $f$ is concave and strictly increasing, $f(0)$ finite.
The possible prices can be $p=(\gamma, \gamma)$ or $p^{\prime}=\left(\frac{1}{\gamma}, \frac{1}{\gamma}\right)$ where $\gamma>1$.
We show that for fixed $\gamma$ one can find function $f$ such that consumer prefers prices $\frac{1}{2} p+\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime}$ to the risky situation. Also for a fixed $f$ one can find $\gamma$ large enough such that the consumer prefers prices $\frac{1}{2} p+\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime}$ to the risky situation. As prices are equal consumer spends half his/her income on each good and gets utility $\frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{y}{2 \gamma}\right)+\frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{y \gamma}{2}\right)$ in the risky situation and $f\left(\frac{y}{2\left(\frac{1}{2} \gamma+\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\gamma}\right)}\right)$ in the non-risky situation.
Let $\gamma$ grow without bound; In the latter expression argument goes to zero in the former this happens only to the first term.

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Fix $\gamma$ and notice that $\frac{y}{2 \gamma}<\frac{y}{\gamma+\frac{1}{\gamma}}<\frac{y \gamma}{2}$.
Consider a piecewise linear function $f(x)=x$ for $x \leq \frac{y}{\gamma+\frac{1}{\gamma}}$, $f(x)=\frac{y}{\gamma+\frac{1}{\gamma}}+\varepsilon\left(x-\frac{y}{\gamma+\frac{1}{\gamma}}\right)$ for $x>\frac{y}{\gamma+\frac{1}{\gamma}}$.

