

Table 1 Lecture topics and schedule

Date	Topic	Lecturer
May 9	Labour supply	Markus Jäntti
May 9	Elasticity of taxable income	Håkan Selin
May 10	Computational methods in public economics	Spencer Bastani
May 10	Empirical political economy	Mattias Nordin
May 11	Taxes and development	Jukka Pirttilä
May 11	Optimal taxation and the top tax rate on incomes	Matti Tuomala
May 12	Income distribution	Markus Jäntti
May 12	Income mobility	Markus Jäntti
May 13	Tax evasion	Kaisa Kotakorpi
May 13	Behavioral economics and income distribution	Jukka Pirttilä

1 Labour supply (Jäntti)

- Richard Blundell (2012). “Tax Policy Reform: The Role of Empirical Evidence”. In: *Journal of European Economic Association* 10.1, pp. 43–77
- Costas Meghir and David Phillips (2010). “Labour supply and taxes”. In: *Dimensions of Tax Design: the Mirrlees Review*. Ed. by James Mirrlees et al. Oxford University Press

2 Elasticity of taxable income (Selin)

Required Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz (2012). “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review”. In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 50.1, pp. 3–50. URL: <https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecolit/v50y2012i1p3-50.html>

Optional As discussed during lectures

3 Computational methods (Bastani)

- TBA

4 Empirical political economy (Nordin)

- Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2002). “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117.4, pp. 1415–1451
- Julia Cagé (2014). “Media Competition, Information Provision and Political Participation”
- Stefano DellaVigna and Ethan Kaplan (2007). “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122.3, pp. 1187–1234
- Thomas Eisensee and David Strömberg (2007). “News Droughts, News Floods, and U. S. Disaster Relief”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122.2, pp. 693–728

- Oliver Falck, Robert Gold, and Stephan Heblich (2014). “E-lections: Voting Behavior and the Internet”. In: *The American Economic Review* 104.7, pp. 2238–2265
- Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan (2008). “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123.2, pp. 703–745
- Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro (2006). “Media Bias and Reputation”. In: *Journal of Political Economy* 114.2, pp. 280–316
- Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro (2010). “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers”. In: *Econometrica* 78.1, pp. 35–71
- Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro (2011). “Ideological Segregation Online and Offline”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126.4, pp. 1799–1839
- Che-Yuan Liang and Mattias Nordin (2013). “The Internet, News Consumption, and Political Attitudes – Evidence for Sweden”. In: *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 13.2, pp. 1071–1093
- Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer (2005). “The Market for News”. In: *The American Economic Review* 95.4, pp. 1031–1053
- Mattias Nordin (2015). “Local Television, Citizen Knowledge and Political Accountability: Evidence from the U.S. Senate”
- James M Snyder and David Strömberg (2010). “Press Coverage and Political Accountability”. In: *Journal of Political Economy* 118.2, pp. 355–408
- David Strömberg (2004). “Radio’s Impact on Public Spending”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119.1, pp. 189–221
- David Strömberg (2015a). “Media and Politics”. In: *Annual Review of Economics* 7.1, pp. 173–205
- David Strömberg (2015b). “Media Coverage and Political Accountability: Theory and Evidence”. In: *Handbook of Media Economics, vol 1B*. ed. by Simon Anderson, Joel Waldfogel, and David Strömberg. North Holland: Elsevier

5 Taxes and development (Pirttilä)

Required Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson (2013). “Chapter 2 - Taxation and Development”. In: *handbook of public economics, vol. 5*. Ed. by Martin Feldstein Alan J. Auerbach Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez. Vol. 5. Handbook of Public Economics. Elsevier, pp. 51–110. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53759-1.00002-9>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537591000029>

Optional Dhammika Dharmapala, Joel Slemrod, and John Douglas Wilson (2011). “Tax policy and the missing middle: Optimal tax remittance with firm-level administrative costs”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 95.9–10. Special Issue: The Role of Firms in Tax Systems, pp. 1036–1047

- Optional Dina Pomeranz (2015). “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax”. In: *American Economic Review* 105.8, pp. 2539–69. DOI: [10.1257/aer.20130393](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130393). URL: <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.20130393>
- Optional Roger Gordon and Wei Li (2009). “Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 93.7–8, pp. 855–866. ISSN: 0047-2727. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.04.001>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004727270900036X>
- Optional Giulia Mascagni (2014). *A Review of Tax Experiments: from the Lab to the Field*. Evidence report 97. Institute for Development Studies
- Optional Michael Keen (2008). “VAT, tariffs, and withholding: Border taxes and informality in developing countries”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 92, pp. 1892–1906
- Optional M. Shahe Emran and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2005). “On selective indirect tax reform in developing countries”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 89.4. Cornell - {ISPE} Conference on Public Finance and Development, pp. 599–623. ISSN: 0047-2727. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.04.007>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704000933>
- Optional Michael Keen and Ben Lockwood (2010). “The value added tax: Its causes and consequences”. In: *Journal of Development Economics* 92.2, pp. 138–151. ISSN: 0304-3878. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.012>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387809000133>
- Optional Kaisa Alavuotunki and Jukka Pirttilä (2015). *The consequences of the value-added tax on inequality*. Working Paper 38. UNU-WIDER
- Optional Henrik J. Kleven and Mazhar Waseem (2013). “Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan”. In: 128.2, pp. 669–723
- Optional Michael Keen (2012). *Taxation and Development: Again*. IMF Working Papers 12/220. International Monetary Fund
- Optional W. Prichard, A.f Cobham, and A. Goodall (2014). *The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset*. Working Paper 19. International Centre for Taxation and Development
- Optional Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez (2016). “Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries”. In: *Economica* 83.330, pp. 219–246. ISSN: 1468-0335. DOI: [10.1111/ecca.12182](https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12182). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12182>

6 Optimal taxation and the top tax rate on incomes (Tuomala)

- Anthony B Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez (2011). “Top income in the Long Run of History”. In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 49.1, pp. 3–71

- Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva (2014). “Optimal Taxation of Top Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities”. In: *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6, pp. 230–271
- Marja Riihelä, Risto Sullström, and Matti Tuomala (2013). *Top Incomes and Top Tax Rates: Implications for Optimal Taxation of Top Incomes in Finland*. Tampere Economic Working Papers 81. Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere
- Matti Tuomala (2016). *Optimal Redistributive Taxation*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

7 Income distribution

- Stephen P Jenkins and Philippe Van Kerm (2009). “The measurement of economic inequality”. In: *Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality*. Ed. by Wiemer Salverda, Brian Nolan, and Timothy M Smeeding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chap. 3, pp. 40–70

8 Income mobility

- Markus Jääntti and Stephen Jenkins (2015). “Income mobility”. In: *Handbook of Income Distribution*. Ed. by Anthony B Atkinson and François Bourguignon. Vol. 2. Elsevier. Chap. 10, pp. 807–935

9 Behavioral economics and income distribution (Pirttilä)

- Required Raj Chetty (2015). “Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective”. In: *American Economic Review* 105.5, pp. 1–33. DOI: [10.1257/aer.p20151108](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151108). URL: <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/?doi=10.1257/aer.p20151108>
- Optional Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft (2009). “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence”. In: *American Economic Review* 99.4, pp. 1145–77. DOI: [10.1257/aer.99.4.1145](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1145). URL: <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/?doi=10.1257/aer.99.4.1145>
- Optional Emmanuel Farhi and Xavier Gabaix (2015). *Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents*. Working Paper 21524. National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: [10.3386/w21524](https://doi.org/10.3386/w21524). URL: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w21524>
- Optional Raj Chetty et al. (2014). “Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129.3, pp. 1141–1219. DOI: [10.1093/qje/qju013](https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju013). eprint: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/129/3/1141.full.pdf+html>. URL: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/129/3/1141.abstract>
- Optional Amy Finkelstein (2009). “E-ztax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124.3, pp. 969–1010. DOI: [10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.969](https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.969). eprint: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/3/969.full.pdf+html>. URL: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/3/969.abstract>

- Optional Markus Haavio and Kaisa Kotakorpi (2011). “The political economy of sin taxes”. In: *European Economic Review* 55.4, pp. 575–594. ISSN: 0014-2921. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurocorev.2010.06.002>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292110000607>
- Optional Ravi Kanbur, Jukka Pirttilä, and Matti Tuomala (2008). “Moral Hazard, Income Taxation and Prospect Theory*”). In: *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 110.2, pp. 321–337. ISSN: 1467-9442. DOI: [10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00541.x](http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00541.x). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00541.x>
- Optional Thomas Aronsson and Olof Johansson-Stenman (2012). “Veblen’s theory of the leisure class revisited: implications for optimal income taxation”. In: *Social Choice and Welfare* 41.3, pp. 551–578. ISSN: 1432-217X. DOI: [10.1007/s00355-012-0701-3](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0701-3). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0701-3>
- Optional Gabriel D. Carroll et al. (2009). “Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124.4, pp. 1639–1674. DOI: [10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1639](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1639.eprint). eprint: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1639.full.pdf+html>. URL: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1639.abstract>
- Optional David Laibson (1997). “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112.2, pp. 443–478. DOI: [10.1162/003355397555253](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/112/2/443.full.pdf+html). eprint: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/112/2/443.full.pdf+html>. URL: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/112/2/443.abstract>
- Optional Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea (2001). “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116.4, pp. 1149–1187. DOI: [10.1162/003355301753265543](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/4/1149.full.pdf+html). eprint: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/4/1149.full.pdf+html>. URL: <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/4/1149.abstract>
- Optional Jonathan Gruber and Botond Kőszegi (2004). “Tax incidence when individuals are time-inconsistent: the case of cigarette excise taxes”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 88.9–10, pp. 1959–1987. ISSN: 0047-2727. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.06.001>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004727270300077X>
- Optional Antonio Rangel B. Douglas Bernheim (2007). “Toward Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics”. In: *The American Economic Review* 97.2, pp. 464–470. ISSN: 00028282. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034496>
- Optional B. Douglas Bernheim (2009). “Behavioral Welfare Economics”. In: *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7.2/3, pp. 267–319. ISSN: 15424766, 15424774. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40282753>
- Optional Antonio Rangel B. Douglas Bernheim (2009). “Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124.1, pp. 51–104. ISSN: 00335533, 15314650. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40506224>
- Optional Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2006). “Optimal sin taxes”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 90.10–11, pp. 1825–1849. ISSN: 0047-2727. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/>

[10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.001](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.001). URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272706000247>

- Optional Matthew Rabin Botond Köszegi (2007). “Mistakes in Choice-Based Welfare Analysis”. In: *The American Economic Review* 97.2, pp. 477–481. ISSN: 00028282. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034498>
- Optional Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin (2008). “Choices, situations, and happiness”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 92.8–9. Special Issue: Happiness and Public Economics, pp. 1821 – 1832. ISSN: 0047-2727. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.03.010>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272708000625>
- Optional Wolfgang Pesendorfer Faruk Gul (2001). “Temptation and Self-Control”. In: *Econometrica* 69.6, pp. 1403–1435. ISSN: 00129682, 14680262. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692262>
- Optional RAVI KANBUR and MATTI TUOMALA (2013). “RELATIVITY, INEQUALITY, AND OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION”. in: *International Economic Review* 54.4, pp. 1199–1217. ISSN: 1468-2354. DOI: [10.1111/iere.12033](http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12033). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12033>
- Optional Ravi Kanbur, Jukka Pirttilä, and Matti Tuomala (2006). “NON-WELFARIST OPTIMAL TAXATION AND BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS”. in: *Journal of Economic Surveys* 20.5, pp. 849–868. ISSN: 1467-6419. DOI: [10.1111/j.1467-6419.2006.00268.x](http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2006.00268.x). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2006.00268.x>
- Optional Nicholas Stern (2010). “Presidential Address: Imperfections in the Economics of Public Policy, Imperfections in Markets, and Climate Change”. In: *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8.2-3, pp. 253–288
- Optional Nicholas Stern (2007). “Comment”. In: *Behavioral Economics and Its Applications*. Ed. by Peter Diamond and Hannu Vartiainen. Princeton University Press
- Optional Jan-Emmanuel De Neve et al. (2014). *Individual Experience of Positive and Negative Growth is Asymmetric: Evidence from Subjective Well-being Data*. Tech. rep. CEP Discussion Paper No 1304. London School of Economics: Centre for Economic Performance
- Optional Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters, and Michael A. Shields (2008). “Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles”. In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 46.1, pp. 95–144
- Optional Christopher J. Boyce et al. (2013). “Money, Well-Being, and Loss Aversion. Does an Income Loss Have a Greater Effect on Well-Being Than an Equivalent Income Gain?” In: *Psychological Science* 24.12, pp. 2557–2562
- Optional Anandi Mani et al. (2013). “Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function”. In: *Science* 341.6149, pp. 976–980
- Optional Thomas Dohmen et al. (2011). “Relative versus absolute income, joy of winning, and gender: Brain imaging evidence”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 95.3–4, pp. 279 –285
- Optional Amartya Sen (1999). *Development as Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press

10 Tax evasion (Kotakorpi)

- Required Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al. (2011). “Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark”. In: *Econometrica* 79.3, pp. 651–692
- Optional M Allingham and Angmar Sandmo (1972). “Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis”. In: *Journal of Public Economics* 1.z, pp. 323–338
- Optional James Andreoni, B Erard, and J Feinstein (1998). “Tax Compliance”. In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 36.z, pp. 818–860
- Optional Nadja Dwenger et al. (2015). “Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany”. In: *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* x.y. (Forthcoming), xx–yy
- Optional Dina Pomeranz (2015). “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax”. In: *American Economic Review* 105.8, pp. 2539–69. DOI: [10.1257/aer.20130393](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130393). URL: <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.20130393>
- Optional J Shaw, Joel Slemrod, and J Whiting (2009). “Administration & Compliance”. In: *The Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Optional Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki (2002). “Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration”. In: *Handbook of Public Economics*. Ed. by Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein. Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Chap. x, pp. 1423–1470
- Optional Joel Slemrod (2016). “Tax Compliance and Enforcement: New Research and Its Policy Implications”. Mimeo, University of Michigan
- Optional Joel Slemrod (2007). “Cheating ourselves: The economics of tax evasion”. In: *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21.z, pp. 25–48
- Optional Joel Slemrod and C Gillitzer (2013). *Tax systems*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press